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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

DEANNA FOXLEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

}
)
)

v,

}

WILLIAM N. FOXLEY,

)

Defendant-Petitioner.

PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI

Case No.

)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in failing to effect

the rule of law articulated by this court in Jones v. Jones, 700
P.2d

1072 (1985) and Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d

123 (Utah App.

1987) wherein three factors must be considered and incorporated
into Findings of Fact in awarding a party alimony?
II.

Does the effect of the opinion of the Utah Court of

Appeals relative to how the court should receive a Child Support
Worksheet Schedule pursuant to §78-45-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953,
as amended) put it in conflict with Rules 801(a) and (b) , 802, 803,
901 and 902, Utah Rules of Evidence?
III. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in failing to effect
the rule of law articulated by this court in Delatore v. Delatore,
680 P. 2d 27 (Utah 1984) wherein it did not reverse and strike
attorney's fees awarded to plaintiff/appellee?

IV.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in failing to grant

defendant/appellant a new trial pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure?
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Defendant/husband petitions this court for review by a Writ of
Certiorari
Appeals,

of

the decision and

judgment

of

the Utah Court of

Foxley v. Foxley, Civil No. 890493-CA

(Utah Ct. App.

1990); Exhibit "A" - Appendix.
The court affirmed the decision and implemented the order of
Judge Richard Moffat holding that he did not abuse his discretion
in modifying a Decree of Divorce raising alimony from $10.00 per
month to $1,350.00 per month without termination date, awarding an
increase of child support from $450.00 per month to $1,547.00 per
month (3 children), denying defendant's post trial motions for a
new trial and Motion to Dismiss.

The court did reverse the award

of attorneyfs fees and remand for a determination of their amount.
Foxley, (supra).
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to review the opinion of the Court of Appeals
entered in this matter December 3, 1990, is vested in the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Const. Art. VIII, §3; Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(2) (1987); and R. Appellate Procedure 42, 43 & 45.
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CONTROLLING AUTHORITY
The following provisions of Utah Code Ann. §30-3-1(1), §30-35(3), §78-45-7 (1989); Rules 801(a) and (b) , 802, 803 and 902, Utah
Rules of Evidence.
30-3-1(1).
(1)

Procedure - Residence - Grounds.

Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as

provided by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as provided
in this chapter.
30-3-5(3).
care

of

Disposition of property - Maintenance and health

parties

and

children

-

Court

to

have

continuing

jurisdiction - Custody and visitation - Termination of alimony Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(3)

The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent

changes or new orders
parties,

the

custody

for the support and maintenance of the
of

the

children

and

their

support,

maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the
property as is reasonable and necessary.
78-45-7.

Determination of amount of support

- Rebuttable

guidelines.
(1)

Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted

by prior court order unless there has been a material change of
circumstance on the part of the obligor or obligee.
(2)

If no prior court order exists, or a material change in

circumstances has occurred, the court determining the amount of
prospective support shall reguire each party to file a proposed
3

award

of

awarding
granted.
(3)

child

support

child support

using

the

guidelines

or modifying

before

an existing

an

order

award may

be

(Emphasis added).
If the court

finds sufficient

evidence

to rebut

the

guidelines, the court shall establish support after considering all
relevant factors including but not limited to:
(a)

the standard of living and situation of the parties;

(b)

the relative wealth and income of the parties;

(c)

the ability of the obligor to earn;

(d)

the ability of the obligee to earn;

(e)

the needs of

the obligee, the obligor, and

the

child;
(f)

the ages of the parties;

(g)

the responsibility of the obligor for the support of

others.
(4)

When

no

prior

court

order

exists,

the

court

shall

determine and assess all arrearages based upon, but not limited to:
(a)

the amount of public assistance received

by the

obligee, if any; and
(b)

the funds that have been reasonably and necessarily

expended in support of spouse and children.
Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Definitions.

The following definitions apply under this article:
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(a)

Statement.

assertion or

A "statement11 is (1) an oral or written

(2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is

intended by him as an assertion.
(b)

Declarant.

A "declarant" is a person who makes a

statement.
Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Hearsay Rule.

Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by
these rules.
Rule

803, Utah

Rules

of

Evidence.

Hearsay

exceptions;

availability of declarant immaterial.
See Exhibit "B" - Appendix.
Rule

901,

Utah

Rules

of

Evidence.

Requirement

of

authentication or identification.
See Exhibit "B" - Appendix.
Rule 902, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Self-authentication.

See Exhibit "B" - Appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, former husband to Respondent (hereafter cited as
"husband") petitions this court for review by a Writ of Certiorari,
the opinion issued by the Utah Court of Appeals affirming all
aspects of a modification of a Decree of Divorce except a reversal
and remand of attorneyfs fees granted by Judge Richard Moffat,
judge of the Third District Court.
The trial

court entered

an Order

increasing

alimony

from

$10.00 per month to $1,350.00 per month, increasing child support
5

from $450.00 per month to $1,547.00 per month and awarding wife
$4,394.00 as and for attorney's fees.
The

husband

filed

several

post

trial

motions

which

were

denied.
The husband then filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals and
a subsequent Petition for Rehearing.

The Court of Appeals affirmed

all aspects of the modification granted by the trial court with the
exception

that

it

reversed

the

award

of

attorney's

fees

and

remanded the matter back to the trial court for a determination of
the amount of attorney's fees.
The

husband

petitions

this

court

for

review

by

Writ

of

Certiorari from that decision.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were married on October 8, 1976.
The marriage of

the parties was

terminated

by Decree of

Divorce entered on August 22, 1983.
In June, 1984, the husband requested a court order for the
wife to appear and show cause why she should not be found in
contempt of court for denying defendant visitation, wife filed a
counterclaim asking for increase in child support, alimony and
attorney's fees.
The conflicting positions of the parties came on for trial on
September 22, 1988, which was continued to March 7, 1989, before
the Honorable Richard Moffat presiding.
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In this case, the wife submitted a Child Support Worksheet
after her case was closed.
The Worksheet was submitted without foundation and without
determining

or

deducting

contributions.

business

expenses

or

insurance

The Worksheet was received by Judge Moffat over

objection by the husband who ruled that the Worksheet could be
submitted at any time.

See Exhibit "C" - Appendix (pg. 112, lines

13-25; pg. 113, lines 1-4).
A statement designated as attorney!s fees was also submitted
after her case was closed.

The statement was submitted without

foundation or testimony and was objected to by the husband.

See

Exhibit "D" - Appendix (pg. 113, lines 16-25; pg. 114, lines 1-25).
Ten

days

later

a

document

dated

March 16,

1989

titled

"Supplement to Attorney's Fees of Robert Hughes" was submitted and
received

over

the

objection

of

husband.

See

Exhibit

"E" -

Appendix.
The trial court ordered child support increased from $450.00
per month (3 children) to $1,547.00 per month,increased alimony
from $10.00 per month to $1,350.00 per month, ordered husband to
provide health and dental insurance and awarded wife $4,394.00 in
attorneyfs fees.
In May,

1989,

the husband

brought

several

post

judgment

motions including a Motion to Set Aside Verdict, Motion for New
Trial, Objection to Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law, Motion to
Dismiss because of perjury of wife.
7

These motions were denied on

August 7, 1989.

See Exhibit "P" - Appendix.

On August 21, 1989,

the husband filed an Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals.

On

October 12, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision except it reversed the award of attorney's fees
and remanded it back to the trial court to determine an amount.
October 26, 1990, the husband filed a Request for Rehearing.

On

This

petition was denied on December 3, 1990.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO EFFECT THE
RULE OF LAW ARTICULATED BY THIS COURT IN JONES V. JONES,
700 P.2D 1072 (1985) AND RUHSAM V. RUHSAM, 742 P.2d 123
(Utah App. 1987), WHEREIN THREE FACTORS MUST BE
CONSIDERED AND INCORPORATED INTO FINDINGS OF FACT IN
AWARDING A PARTY ALIMONY.

This court should grant husband a review by Writ of Certiorari
on the grounds that the ruling by the Court of Appeals is contrary
to decisions of this court and other decisions of the Utah Court of
Appeals.
This court ruled specifically in Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d 1072
(1985) and the Utah Court of Appeals in Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d
123 (Utah App. 1987), that there must be clear rationale for the
level of alimony

awarded

to a party

and

that

the court

must

consider three criteria in determining the level of alimony.
The trial court failed to specify anything in its findings nor
was there any evidence offered that would let the court fashion a
dollar amount rationally related to the needs of the wife so the

8

court could set the alimony amount at $1,350.00 per month.

See

Exhibit "6" - Appendix.
Under Jones (supra) , the first prong of the three part test is
that the court has to ascertain the financial conditions and needs
of the wife.

This necessarily has to be stated in terms of dollars

and cents so that the court can assess the second prong as to
whether the wife could produce enough income to meet her needs.
The Appellate Court held that test was met because the court
found that "...Mrs. Foxley and the children had experienced some
serious hardships and had been on public assistance even though
Mrs. Foxley

had

responsibilities".

done

an

admirable

Foxley, (supra).

job

in

performing

her

Exhibit "A" - Appendix.

Husband argues that under Jones, (supra), and Ruhsam, (supra),
that the wife f s needs specifically be expressed

in terms of a

dollars and cents finding so the court can rationally fashion an
alimony level and further see if the husband can financially meet
the level.
findings.
II.

It is reversible error not to make such specific
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987).

THE EFFECT OF THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
RELATIVE TO HOW THE COURT SHOULD RECEIVE A CHILD SUPPORT
WORKSHEET PURSUANT TO §78-45-7, Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended) PUTS IT IN CONFLICT WITH THE UTAH
RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULES 801(a) AND (b) , 802, 803, 901
and 902.

In this case, the wife submitted a Child Support Worksheet
after the case was closed, without foundation and without deducting

9

business

expenses

or

insurance

contributions

of

the

husband

pursuant to §78-45-7 (1953, as amended).
Even though this section went into effect on April 24, 1989
after the trial on March 7, 1989, the court stated that by law he
was required to accept the Worksheet (see Exhibit "C" - Appendix;
pg. 112, lines 23-25) and its Finding No. 21 indicated that the
child support amount would be set as "...reflected in the judicial
districts support guidelines."

See Exhibit "G" - Appendix.

The husband argued in his Brief to the Court of Appeals that
the Child Support Worksheet was hearsay pursuant to Rule 801(a),
801(b), 802 and 803, Utah Rules of Evidence, was not admissible and
not within any of the exceptions as provided by Rule 901 and 902.
Further, the husband argued that the wife laid no foundation, but
merely submitted it to the court after resting her case.

See

Exhibit "C" - Appendix.
The Court of Appeals did not address this issue in its written
opinion.
The husband

moved

for a rehearing

arguing

overlooked this issue and requested a ruling.

the court

had

The Court of Appeals

denied the husband's request for a rehearing.
The husband does not argue the technicality that §78-45-7,
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), was not in effect at the
time of trial because both parties submitted Worksheets.
The trial judge was under the impression that the Worksheet
could be submitted at anytime and the court was required by law to
10

accept one. Such an approach puts §78-45-7(2), Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended),

in direct conflict with the Utah Rules of

Evidence.
Section 78-45-7(2), Utah Code Annotated

(1953, as amended),

provides:
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a
material change in circumstances has occurred,
the court determining the amount of prospective support shall require each party to file
a proposed award of child support using the
guidelines before an order awarding child
support or modifying an existing award may be
granted.
The husband would argue that evidentiary safeguards should not
be overlooked

and

that

a modification

of

child

support

is a

proceeding in divorce and should be conducted pursuant to the Rules
of Evidence.
Section 30-3-1(1), Utah Code Annotated

(1953, as amended),

provides:
(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced
and
conducted
as
provided
by
law
for
proceedings
in civil
causes, except
as
provided in this chapter.
The failure of the Court of Appeals to make a ruling on this
issue leaves the state of the law unclear.
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III. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE
TRIAL COURTfS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO LAW AS
ENUNCIATED BY THIS COURT IN DELATORE V. DELATORE, 680
P.2d 27 (1984) .
At the end of trial, the wife made a proffer over the
objection of the defendant of attorney's fees.

See Exhibit "D" -

Appendix (pg. 114, lines 7-25; pg. 115, lines 1-9).
The wife proffered that attorney's fees were $3,000.00.

See

Exhibit "D" - Appendix (pg. 115, lines 1-4).
This amount was admitted over objection of defendant.
Ten days after the trial counsel for husband received a 3-page
document, dated March 16, 1989, entitled supplement to attorney's
fees of Robert Hughes.
The document

See Exhibit "E" - Appendix.

was not

in affidavit

form

and

instead of

$3,000.00 previous balance, showed a balance of $3,180.00.
The amount due on the bottom of the statement attachment was
$4,394.25.
This is the figure that the court used in its award of
attorney's fees without further hearing or evidence.
The Utah Court Appeals found that "...Mr. Foxley does not
challenge
attorney's

Mrs. Foxley's

need

or

entitlement

fees and costs..." Foxley,

to an

award

(supra), Exhibit

of

"A" -

Appendix (pg. 5) and reversed the award and remanded it back to the
trial court for a determination of amount only.
The law in Utah is that an award of attorney's fees must be
based on evidence showing first that there is a financial need of
12

the person
reasonable.

receiving

the

award

and

second

that

the

award

is

Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d, 1076 (Utah 1988); Porco

v. Porco, 752 P.2d (Utah App. 1988).
On page 39 of his Brief, the husband argued that the wife did
not put on evidence of need for attorneyfs fees.

This is contrary

to the opinion of the Appellate Court that the husband did not
challenge the need or entitlement of the wife to attorney's fees.
The burden of proof of need and entitlement is on Respondent not
Appellate.

Mr. Foxley did challenge this fact in his Brief that

Mrs. Foxley did not meet her burden of proof as to need as required
by Utah case law.
Warner

v. Warner,

Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27 (Utah 1984);
655

P.2d

684, 688

(Utah

1982);

Gardner

v.

Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988).
The husband made a motion for rehearing to the Utah Court of
Appeals and requested the court to review his Brief because he had
challenged this issue both at trial and in his Brief.

The Court of

Appeals denied the husband's motion.
Delatore, (supra), is factually similar to this case at bar.
There this court ordered that the award of attorney's fees
should be stricken because the only reference in the record to
attorney's fees were in opening and closing statements that they
were requested.
This court pointed out the long list of precedent whereby the
evidentiary requirement is testimony regarding the necessity of the
number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate changed
13

in light of the difficulty of the case and the rates commonly
charged

in the community.

The wife admits

that there was no

evidence, but argues the court took judicial notice of these facts.
Clearly the Court of Appeals erred in not striking the award of
attorney's fees.
Further, the Court of Appeals is not consistent in applying
the standard.
In Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah
Court of Appeals reversed an award of attorney's fees when the
wife's

counsel

proffered

testimony

and

produced

an

exhibit

itemizing the time and costs expended and the hourly rates charged.
The court reversed the award of attorney's fees because there was
no evidence regarding the "...necessity of the number of hours
dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the
difficulty of the case and the result accomplished, and the rates
commonly charged for divorce action in the community...."
at bar is factually the same.

The case

The Court of Appeals should have

stricken the award of attorney's fees under Talley, (supra).
The husband seeks a Writ of Certiorari

from this court to

reverse and strike the award of attorney's fees.
IV.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO REMAND THIS
MATTER BACK TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL PURSUANT
TO RULE 59, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
(a) Grounds.
Subject to the provisions of
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any
14

of the parties and on all or part of the issues,
for any of the following causes...
(1) Irregularity
the...adverse party...

in

the

proceedings

of

(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for
the party making the application, which he could
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial...
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the verdict or other decision, or that it is
against law...."
The husband
presented

the

in a post

court

with

judgment motion

affidavits

by

one

in District
Robert

Court

Farr

that

plaintiff had committed perjury at trial in at least the following
particulars (Exhibit "H" - Appendix):
(1)

Plaintiff in discovery and at trial represented that

she had one bank account when she in fact had a secret bank
account that she ran money through.
Defendant

alleges

that

an

attorney

that

plaintiff

socialized with advised her not to disclose the existence of
the account.
(2)

Plaintiff

in discovery and at the time of trial

asked plaintiff to disclose her assets.

Plaintiff failed to

disclose that she had purchased an airplane having invested
$4,500.00 in said asset.
Defendant

claimed

that

this

fact

was

material

plaintiff represented that she was in need of alimony.

15

as

(3)

Plaintiff in discovery and in trial represented that

her home was in substantial disrepair and that she did not
have adequate funds to repair the same.

After trial she

submitted a bill to the underlying mortgage holder that she
had expended $19,000.00 towards improvements on the home that
she had testified she needed alimony to make.

This perjury on

its face.
Because of these accusations by the adverse party, the trial
judge should have ordered an evidentiary hearing as requested by
the husband or held plaintiff in contempt of court and ordered a
new trial or dismissed plaintiff's petition.
Even assuming that defendant did not commit perjury, the above
evidence would constitute new evidence not available at trial.
In defendant's motion for new trial based on the foregoing,
defendant was asked why he could not have discovered that plaintiff
had purchased an airplane for $4,500.00.
Defendant responded by indicating to the court that three (3)
weeks after

the trial, defendant's

counsel was contacted

by a

person whom plaintiff was suing over the airplane.
Plaintiff's response is contained in the transcript and her
counsel characterizes the airplane situation as "...a more thorny
issue" (Exhibit "I" - Appendix (pg. 53, lines 7-8) and argues if
there was error in failure to disclose it should be harmless error.
Defendant would emphatically emphasize that one of the major
issues was the needs of the plaintiff.
16

Certainly if the plaintiff

shelled

out

$4,500.00

for

an

airplane,

$19,000.00

for

home

improvements, intentional failure to disclose these items is not
harmless error.
The Utah Court of Appeals in its opinion made the following
comments:
"Mr. Foxley also moved for a new trial,
pointing to evidence unearthed after trial
concerning Ms. Foxleyfs assets. Ms. Foxley is
said to have expended $4,500.00 toward the
purchase of an airplane, as well as $19,000.00
for improvements on her home.
She explains
the airplane purchase as an investment of her
modest savings from assets awarded to her at
the end of her prior marriage. The enterprise
in which she invested has proven worthless,
and recovery of her funds through litigation
is now contingent at best.
Meanwhile, the
extreme economic disparity between these
parties remains.
Mr. Foxley
argues
that
Ms. Foxleyfs
expenditure of $19,000.00 to repair her home
belies her claim that she lacked assets to do
so. Even if we assume that the fact of this
alleged expenditure could not, with diligence,
have been discovered in time for trial, it is
not grounds for retrying the case.
The
$19,000.00 figure reported by Ms. Foxley to
her mortgagee included a substantial amount
representing value of labor she performed, and
it remains entirely plausible that she may,
despite her efforts, lack the money necessary
to pay for needed materials and completed
repairs exceeding her abilities.
Moreover,
the $19,000.00 of home repairs does not
necessarily indicate that she and the children
have additional assets or no additional needs,
a
circumstance
which
seems
improbable,
considering
the
low
level
of
support
Mr. Foxley has provided over the years.
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The Court of Appeals includes in its opinion statement of
facts as to the wife ! s expenditures that the husband has alleged as
perjury and new evidence.
The husband at the trial level moved the court to hold an
evidentiary hearing so that he could refute the wife's proffer that
the Court of Appeals now accepts as proven facts.

Instead, the

trial court dismissed the husband's motion for evidentiary hearing
and motion for new trial.
argument

for

an

The husband would argue that the wife's

increase

in

alimony

centers

around

her

unsubstantiated needs in light of this proffer of evidence.

The

husband urges this court to grant his writ so that his claims can
be argued in an evidentiary forum with his right to confront and
cross-examine the wife.
CONCLUSION
The

trial

court

in

domestic

matters

has

been

granted

considerable latitude in exercising its discretion and equitable
powers

to

fashion

remedies

to

provide

for

alimony

and

the

maintenance and support of the children and parties under §30-3-5,
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) and the decisions of this
court.

The court has continuing jurisdiction under §30-3-5, Utah

Code Annotated (1953, as amended) to make subsequent orders, as
necessary, in keeping with public policy to protect the interest of
the parties and children and to reduce the social and economic
costs to the state as a result of divorce.
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This court has ruled

that to avoid challenge in awarding

alimony, the trial court must consider three factors:
1.

The financial condition and needs of the spouse

claiming support;
2.

Ability

of

that

spouse

to provide

a sufficient

income for herself;
3.

Ability of the responding spouse to pay.

Jones, (supra).
The Utah Court of Appeals opinion erred in not reversing the
trial court's judgments of alimony because the trial court failed
to show a clear rationale for the level of alimony consistent with
the criteria of Ruhsam, (supra).
The Rules of Evidence and evidentiary foundation should be
required in all contested matters where a Child Support Worksheet
is submitted.

Because the wife did not properly lay a foundation

and did not introduce evidence to support the amounts used in the
Worksheet, the award of child support should be reversed.
The Appellate court erred in not reversing in total the award
of attorney's fees and granting the husband a new trial or an
evidentiary hearing.
DATED this *ffi7

day of December, 1990

Greg S.^Ericksen
Attorney for Defendant-Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
day of December, 1990, I
mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
to:
Robert W. Hughes
1000 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah
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This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is
now ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the
district court herein be, and the same is, affirmed. We
therefore reverse the award of attorney fees and costs and
remand for a determination of their amount.
Opinion of the Court by ROBERT L. NEWEY, Senior
Juvenile Court Judge, sitting by special appointment;
REGNAL W. GARFF, and NORMAN H. JACKSON, Court of Appeals

Judges, concur.
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Deanna Foxley,

OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 890493-CA
v.
William M. Foxley,

F I L E D
October 12, 1990

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District Court, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat
Attorneys:

Greg S. Ericksen, Bountiful, Attorney for Appellant
Robert W. Hughes, Salt Lake City, Attorney for
Appellee

Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Newey.1
NEWEY, Judge:
Defendant William Foxley appeals from the modification of
the decree divorcing him from plaintiff Deanna Foxley. We
affirm.
The Foxleys were married in October, 1976, when Mr. Foxley
was a graduate student and Ms. Foxley an undergraduate
student. They separated in April 1982 and were divorced in
August 1983, after Mr. Foxley had just graduated from medical
school in June 1983. Mr. Foxley has since completed residency
and developed a professional practice specializing in
obstetrics and gynecology. In June 1984, Ms. Foxley received a
bachelor's degree in sociology and has since continued her
education.
During the marriage, three children were born to the
Foxleys, and Mr. Foxley adopted a daughter from Ms. Foxley's
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, sitting by
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10)
(Supp. 1990).

prior marriage. This*daughter has reached the age of majority
since the decree was entered in 1983. The decree awarded Ms.
Foxley monthly child support of $150 per child and alimony of
$10 per month, based in part on Mr. Foxley*s meager income
during medical school.
The decree was not formally modified until July 1989, when
the district court increased alimony to $1,350 per month and
child support to $546 per month per child. Mr. Foxley has
appealed from that modification.
Substantial Change of Circumstances
The alimony award of the initial decree appears to have
been based on Mr. Foxley's background as a medical student and
the prospect of an increase in his income following graduation
from medical school:
[Ms. Foxley] is awarded an interest in
[Mr. Foxley's] medical degree, and is
awarded the sum of $10.00 per month as
alimony, and . . . at such time as there
has been a material change in
circumstances of the parties, the issues
of child support and/or alimony may be
reviewed.
Clearly, the change in Mr. Foxley*s income from the negligible
earnings of an unemployed student to his earnings in recent
years well in excess of $100,000 per year is a substantial
change of circumstances justifying a modification of the 1983
decree. See Navlor v. Navlor, 700 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 1985);
Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251-52 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Mr. Foxley argues, however, that the premise for the trial
court's modification was not the stated substantial change in
circumstances, but rather in reality a revision of the original
decree to include equitable restitution, which was not awarded
in the original decree. Decisional law since the 1983 decree
has held that a medical degree is not marital property, but
instead has permitted equitable restitution to take into
account a spouse's academic attainments in which the other
spouse has assisted. See Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, granted, 765 P.2d 1277 (1988).
However, the trial court in this case expressly declined to
base this modification on the equitable restitution doctrine,
and noted instead that a substantial change in circumstances

supported the modification. From the court's comments at the
modification hearing,-equitable restitution was apparentlyconsidered, but the trial court did not rest its decision on
equitable restitution. The trial court may appropriately make
its award based on a substantial change of circumstances with
supporting findings, instead of choosing to base its decision
on equitable restitution.
Amounts of Alimony and Child Support
If the trial court's findings and conclusions2 show that
the court considered the material factors,3 we accord
considerable discretion to the trial court in determining the
amounts of alimony and child support.4 In this case, the trial
court found Mr. Foxley's income to be in the range between
$120,000 and $224,000.5 The court also found that Ms. Foxley
and the children had experienced some serious hardships and had
been on public assistance, even though Ms. Foxley had done "an
admirable job" in performing her responsibilities. In light of
these findings, the increases in alimony and child support are
far from abuses of the trial court's discretion.
2. Adequate findings and conclusions are required, see Acton
v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987); Stevens v. Stevens, 754
P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752
P.2d 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
3. Regarding alimony, see Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075
(Utah 1985). Regarding child support, see Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45-7(2)(1987); £££ also Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d
~ 393, 394 (Utah 1985).
4. Paffel v, Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986) (alimony);
Proctor v. Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389 (Utah App. 1989) (child
support) .
5. Mr. Foxley asserts that the evidence is inadequate to
support the finding on the amount of his income. However, in
thus attacking the finding, Mr. Foxley has the burden to
marshall all of the evidence in support of the finding and then
demonstrate from it that the finding is clearly erroneous.
Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989); Riche v. Riche,
784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989). He has failed to do so, and the
finding therefore stands.
We note that the requirement of marshalling the evidence
is especially appropriate in this case, since Mr. Foxley
complains about the lack of evidence under his control and
concerning a fact that he is in the best position to know.

Post-Trial Motions
With little authority or analysis, Mr. Foxley argues that
the trial court erred.in denying his motions for a directed
verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Those
motions clearly have no place in this case. A verdict is the
decision of a jury,6 and in this case, there was no jury.
Mr. Foxley also moved for a new trial, pointing to
evidence unearthed after trial concerning Ms. Foxley1s assets.
Ms. Foxley is said to have expended $4,500 toward the purchase
of an airplane, as well as $19,000 for improvements on her
home. She explains the airplane purchase as an investment ofher modest savings from assets awarded to her at the end of-her
prior marriage. The enterprise in which she invested has
proven worthless, and recovery of her funds through litigation
is now contingent at best. Meanwhile, the extreme economic
disparity between these parties remains.
Mr. Foxley argues that Ms. Foxley*s expenditure of $19,000
to repair her home belies her claim that she lacked assets to
do so. Even if we assume that the fact of this alleged
expenditure could not, with diligence, have been discovered in
time for trial, it is not grounds for retrying the case. The
$19,000 figure reported by Ms. Foxley to her mortgagee included
a substantial amount representing value of labor she performed,
and it remains entirely plausible that she may, despite her
efforts, lack the money necessary to pay for needed materials
and completed repairs exceeding her abilities. Moreover, the
$19,000 of home repairs does not necessarily indicate that she
and the children have additional assets or no additional needs,
a circumstance which seems improbable, considering the low
level of support Mr. Foxley has provided over the years.
For newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial, the
evidence must have a probative weight sufficient to have a
probable effect on the result. Greoerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d
369, 372 (Utah 1980); £££ 9lsp Dotv v. Town of Cedar Hills, 656
P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1982). The evidence Mr. Foxley proffers
does not have that degree of probative value, and the trial
court thus did not abuse its discretion7 in denying his motion
for a new trial.
6.

Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (5th ed. 1979).

7. S££ Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 173 (Utah 1983)
(-trial court has wide discretion to grant or deny a motion for
a new trial"); Chournos v. D'Aanillo. 642 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah
1982).

Attorney Fees and Costs
Mr. Foxley does-not challenge Ms. Foxley \s*need&£o£iLafe
entitlement to an award of attorney'fees and costs?^btitvrather^
he questions the evidentiary basis establishing >-the
reasonableness of the amount awarded. Ms. Foxley proffered
evidence of the amount of her attorney fees over Mr. Foxley1s
objection, and she later filed an unsworn statement concerning
them. There is, however, no admissible evidence in the record
to substantiate the reasonableness of amount awarded. Since
Mr. Foxley objected to the lack of evidence, and thereby placed
in issue the basis for determining fact of reasonableness, an
evidentiary basis for the amount awarded needs to be
established.
We therefore reverse the award of attorney fees
and costs and remand for a determination of their amount.
The modification of the parties' divorce decree is
affirmed in all other respects.9

M* //fiLiiA

Robert L. Newey, wudge

Norman H. Jackson,kludge
8. Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Asper v. Asper, 752 P.2d 365, 368 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
9. There is no merit to the claim that the trial judge should
have been disqualified for bias. See State v. Gardner, 789
P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989) (recusal required only where
substantial rights of the party are shown to be affected); s&&
also Qnyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc.. 787 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) (timely objection required to raise question of
judicial bias); S3& generally Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. &
Loan, 767 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988).
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ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Deanna Foxley,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 890493-CA

v.
William M. Foxley,
Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Jackson, Garff, and Newey.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Appellee's
Petition for Rehearing, filed October 26, 1990,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellee's Petition for Rehearing
is denied.
Dated this

•

»

FOR THE COURT

'Mary

Noonan, Clerk

day of November, 1990.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of December, 1990, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail to each of
the following:
Robert W. Hughes
Attorney for Appellee
1000 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Greg S. Ericksen
Attorney for Appellant
1065 So. 500 West
Bountiful, UT 84010

DATED this 3rd day of December, 1990.

Deputy Clerk
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30-3-1
Section
30-3-10.2.
30-3-10.3.
30-3-10.4.
30-3-10.5.
30-3-10.6.
30-3-11.
30-3-11.1.
30-3-11.2.
30-3-12.
30-3-13.
30-3-13.1.
30-3-14.
30-3-14.1.
30-3-15.
30-3-15.1.

HUSBAND AND WIFE

Joint legal custody order — Factors for court determination —
Public assistance
Terms of joint legal custody order.
Modification or termination of order.
Payments of support, maintenance, and alimony.
Payment under child support order — Judgment
Repealed.
Family Court Act — Purpose.
Appointment of counsel for child.
Courts to exercise family counseling powers.
Repealed.
Establishment of family court division of district court.
Repealed
Designation of judges — Terms
Repealed.
Appointment of domestic relations counselors, family court
commissioner, and assistants
and clerks

Section
30-3-15.2
30-3-15.3.
30-3-15.4.
30-3-16.
30-3-16.1.
30-3-16.2.
30-3-16.3.
30-3-16.4.
30-3-16.5.
30-3-16.6.
30-3-16.7.
30-3-17.
30-3-17.1.
30-3-18.

30-3-19 to

Domestic relations counselors —
Powers.
Commissioners — Powers.
Salaries and expenses.
Repealed.
Jurisdiction of family court division — Powers.
Petition for conciliation.
Contents of petition.
Procedure upon filing of petition.
Fees.
Information not available to public.
Effect of petition — Pendency of
action.
Power and jurisdiction of judge.
Proceedings deemed confidential
— Written evaluation by counselor.
Waiting period for hearing after
filing for divorce — Use of counseling service not to be construed as condonation.
30-3-22. Repealed

30-3-1. Procedure — Residence — Grounds.
(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as provided by law
for proceedings in civil causes, except as provided in this chapter.
(2) The court may decree a dissolution of the marriage contract between the
plaintiff and defendant on the grounds specified in Subsection (3) in all cases
where the plaintiff or defendant has been an actual and bona fide resident of
this state and of the county where the action is brought, or if members of the
armed forces of the United States who are not legal residents of this state,
where the plaintiff has been stationed in this state under military orders, for
three months next prior to the commencement of the action.
(3) Grounds for divorce:
(a) impotency of the defendant at the time of marriage;
(b) adultery committed by the defendant subsequent to marriage;
(c) willful desertion of the plaintiff by the defendant for more than 6ne
year;
(d) willful neglect of the defendant to provide for the plaintiff the common necessaries of life;
(e) habitual drunkenness of the defendant;
(f) conviction of the defendant for a felony;
(g) cruel treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant to the extent of
causing bodily injury or great mental distress to the plaintiff;
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage;
(i) incurable insanity; or
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately under a decree of
separate maintenance of any state for three consecutive years without
m
cohabitation.
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3)0*) does not affect the
liability of either party under any provision for separate maintenance previously granted.
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DIVORCE

30^3-5

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health
care of ^parties and children — Court to have conturning jurisdiction — Custody and visitation —•
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall
include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for the dependent children.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the emplojnnent or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-.
tribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his
rights are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action,
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in
good faith.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L.
1909, ch. 109, S 4; C.L- 1917, § 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3;
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch.
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment by Chapter 72 rewrote Subsection (1);

added Subsection (2); designated two undesignated paragraphs as Subsections (3) and (4);
inserted "In determining" and "the court" in
Subsection (4); redesignated former Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6); divided Subsection (5) into two sentences, substituting "However, if the remarriage" for "unless
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT

78-45-7

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d
978 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

78-45-3. Duty of man.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253 (Utah
1987).

78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Rebuttable guidelines.
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court
order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on the part of
the obligor or obligee.
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the guidelines
before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing award may
be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors including but not
limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(f) the ages of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess
all arrearages based upon, but not limited to:
(a) the amount of public assistance received by the obligee, if any; and
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and necessarily expended in
support of spouse and children.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 7; 1977, ch.
145, § 10; 1984, ch. 13, § 2; 1989, ch. 214, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, divided former
Subsection (2) into present Subsections (2) and
(3) by substituting the language beginning "require each party" at the end of Subsection (2)
and the introductory language in Subsection
(3) for "consider all relevant factors including

but not limited to:"; rewrote Subsection (3)(e),
which had read, "the need of the obligee"; substituted "ages" for "age" in Subsection (3)(f);
redesignated former Subsection (3) as Subsection (4); deleted former Subsection (4), providing for the establishment and use of a uniform
statewide assessment formula; and made
minor stylistic changes.
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Rule 706. Court-appointed experts.
(a) Appointment The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any
party enter an order to show 'cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may
appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint
expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed
by the court unless he consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of his duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with
the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to
participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of his findings, if
any; his deposition may be taken by any party; and he may be called to testify
by the court or any party. He shall be subject to cross-examination by each
party, including a party calling him as a witness.
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable compensation in whatever sum the court may allow. The compensation
thus fixed is payable from funds which may be provided by law in criminal
cases and civil actions and proceedings involving just compensation under the
Fifth Amendment. In other civil actions and proceedings the compensation
shall be paid by the parties in such proportion and at such time as the court
directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court
may authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the
expert witness.
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule limits the
parties in calling expert witnesses of their own selection.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim Rules 59-61 of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953), on which
the Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) were patterned, provided for the appointment, compensation and handling of appointed expert witness testimony These rules were not adopted
in the state of Utah The reason for the rejection is unknown However, the Utah Supreme
Court has previously indicated that a trial

judge has inherent authority to call a witness
Merchants Bank v Goodfeilow, 44 Utah 349,
140 P 759 (1914)
Cross-References. — Blood tests in actions
to determine parentage, appointment of experts by court, ^ 78-25-18 to 78-25-23,
78-45a-7 to 78-45a-10
Cnminal proceedings, court appointment of
expert witnesses, ^ 77-35-15

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Right of independent expert to refuse to testify as to expert opinion, 50
A L.R.4th 680

ARTICLE VIIL
HEARSAY.
Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
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Rule 801

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony or
the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B)
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after
perceiving him; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual
or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a
person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter
within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Advisory Committee Note. — Subsection
ta) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971*
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The hearsay
rule is not applicable in declarations of devices
and machines, e.g., radar The definition of
"hearsay" in subdivision (c) is substantially
the same as Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971).
Subdivision (d)(1) is similar to Rule 63(1),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It deviates from
the federal rule in that it allows use of prior
statements as substantive evidence if (1) inconsistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and
does not require the prior statement to have
been given under oath or subject to perjury.
The former Utah rules admitted such statements as an exception to the hearsay rule. See
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), with
respect to confrontation problems under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Subdivision (d)(1) is as originally promulgated by the United States Supreme Court
with the addition of the language "or the witness denies having made the statement or has
forgotten" and is in keeping with the prior
Utah rule and the actual effect on most juries.

Subdivision <d)(l*<B) is in substance the
same as Rule 63< 1 •. Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its
interpretation of the applicable rule in this
general area. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198,
310 P.2d 366 (1957).
Subdivision (d)(l><C) comports with prior
Utah case law. State v. Owens, 15 Utah 2d 123,
388 P.2d 797 «1964). State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah
2d 277, 451 P.2d 786 (1969).
The substance of subdivision (d)(2)(A) was
contained in Rules 63*6) and (7), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971), as an exception to the hearsay
rule.
Similar provisions to subdivisions (d)(2)(B)
and (C) were contained in Rule 63(8), Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971), as an exception to
the hearsay rule.
Rule 63(9>, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971),
was of similar substance and scope to subdivision (d)(2)(D». except that Rule 63(9) required
that the declarant be unavailable before such
admissions are received. Adoptive and vicarious admissions have been recognized as admissible in criminal as well as civil cases. State v.
Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980).
Statements by a co-conspirator of a party
made during the course and in furtherance of
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ment of the victim's testimony was not hearsay State v Hutchison, 655 P 2d 635 (Utah
1982)
prior inconsistent statement properly excluded See State v Heaps, 711 P 2d 257 (Utah
1985)
Cited in Zion's First Nat'l Bank v
Fennemore 655 P2d 1111 (Utah 1982) State
v Jones, 656 P2d 1012 (Utah 1982), State v
Velasquez, 672 P2d 1254 (Utah 1983), In re

Rule 802

J L K , 728 P2d 988 (Utah 1986); State •
Walker, 743 P 2d 191 (Utah 1987); State ex rei.
State Dep't of Social Servs v Woods, 744 P 2d
315 (Utah Ct App 1987), Tripp v Vaughn,
747 P 2d 1051 (Utah Ct App 1987), State v
Barber, 747 P 2d 436 (Utah Ct App 1987),
Miller v Archer, 749 P 2d 1274 (Utah Ct App
1988), State v Thomas, 111 Utah Adv Rep 24
(1989)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Bngham Young Law Review. — The
Hobgoblin of the Federal Rules of Evidence An
Analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent
Statements and a New Proposal, 1987 B Y U
L Rev 231
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Comment Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the
Courtroom New Utah Rules and Their Consti
tutional Implications 15 J Contemp L 81
•1989)

Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence
§ 493 et seq
C.J.S. — 31A C J S Evidence § 192 et seq
A.L.R. — Admissibility of impeached witness' prior consistent statement—modern state
criminal cases, 58 A L R 4th 1014
Key Numbers. — Evidence «» 314 et seq

Rule 802, Hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
Rule 802 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
(1974) and is the same as the first paragraph
of Rule 63 Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
Cross-References. — Affidavits taking
and certification of ^ 78 26 5 et seq
Contemporaneous entries and writings of decedent as prima facie evidence, ^ 78 25-8

Judgment entry of, Rule 58A, U R C P
Judgment roll in criminal case contents and
filing, * 77-35-22
Marriage certificate, issuance and filing,
^ 30-1-6, 30-1-12
Official records as evidence, § 78-25-3, Rule
44, U R C P
Recording conveyances, § 57-3-1 et seq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general
Chemical breath analysis
Purpose
In general.
Hearsay is generally not admissible on the
ground that it lacks trustworthiness for two
basic reasons (1) the person who purports to
know the facts is not stating them under oath,
(2) that person is not present for cross-examination State v Sibert 6 Utah 2d 198 310 P 2d
388 (1957)

Chemical breath analysis.
Section 41-6-44 3, governing the admission
of chemical breath analysis, is a valid statutory exception to the hearsay rule Layton City
v Bennett, 741 P 2d 965 (Utah Ct App 1987),
cert denied, 765 P2d 1277 (Utah 1988)
Purpose.
The hearsay rule has as its declared purpose
the exclusion of evidence not subject to crossexamination concerning the truthfulness of the
matters asserted State v Long, 721 P 2d 483
(Utah 1986)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law — Com
ment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the
Courtroom New Utah Rules and Their Consti-

tutional Implications, 15 J Contemp L 81
11989)
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Rule 803- Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining
an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event
or condition or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the
execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations,
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a
matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown to
have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in
his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions,
opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances
of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as
used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for
profit.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the
memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in
accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made
and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness. .*
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A)
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the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to
duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report,
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law,
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any
form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof
was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law.
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a
record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement,
or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose
the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or
marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in
a regularly kept record of a religious organization.
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of
fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or
other ceremony or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting
to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time
thereafter.
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family
history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on
rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or
tombstones, or the like.
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The
record of a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the content of the original recorded document and its
execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been
executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable
statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that office.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A
statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an
interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the
document, unless dealings with the property since the document was
made have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in
existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications, ^larket quotations,
tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally
used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations.
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(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an
expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness
or by otker expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members of his family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or
among his associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth,
adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood,
adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of his personal or
family history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of
or customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events
of general history important to the community or State or nation in which
located.
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character
among his associates or in the community.
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment,
entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo
contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain
the judgment, bat not including, when offered by the prosecution in a
criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments
against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may
be shown but does not affect admissibility.
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or
boundaries. Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general
history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be
provable by evidence of reputation.
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that <A» the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known
to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it,
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim. Subdivision (1) is
comparable to Rule 63(4), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (2) is comparable to Rule

63(4)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971». State
v. McMillan, 588 P.2d 162 <Utah 1978 >.
Subdivision (3) is a similar provision to Rule
63(12), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971».
Subdivision (4) is comparable to Rule 63(12),
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Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining
an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event
or condition or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the
execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations,
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a
matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown to
have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in
his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions,
opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances
of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as
used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for
profit.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the
memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in
accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made
and preserved, unless the sources qf information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A)
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the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to
duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report,
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law,
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any
form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof
was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law.
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a
record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement,
or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose
the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or
marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in
a regularly kept record of a religious organization.
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of
fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a.marriage or
other ceremony or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting
to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time
thereafter.
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family
history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on
rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or
tombstones, or the like.
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The
record of a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the content of the original recorded document and its
execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been
executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable
statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that office.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A
statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an
interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the
document, unless dealings with the property since the document was
made have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in
existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations,
tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally
used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations.
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(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an
expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness
or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members of his family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or
among his associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth,
adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood,
adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of his personal or
family history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of
or customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events
of general history important to the community or State or nation in which
located.
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character
among his associates or in the community.
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment,
entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty <but not upon a plea of nolo
contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain
the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution in a
criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments
against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may
be shown but does not affect admissibility
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or
boundaries. Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general
history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be
provable by evidence of reputation.
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts: and (C) the general
purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known
to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it,
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim. Subdivision (1) is
comparable to Rule 63(4), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (2) is comparable to Rule

63(4)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). State
v. McMillan, 588 P.2d 162 (Utah 1978).
Subdivision (3) is a similar provision to Rule
63(12), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (4) is comparable to Rule 63(12),

59P

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

i&ie*ggf

Rule 806. Attacking and supporting credibility of declarant.
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2), (C),
(D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may
be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would
be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent
with his hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that he may
have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against
whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness,
the party is entitled to examine him on the statement as if under cross-examination.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim. Rule 65, Utah Rules

of Evidence (1971), contained a comparable
provision.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
^ 254, 267 et seq.

C.J.S. — 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 190.
Key Numbers. — Evidence «=» 155.

ARTICLE IX.
AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION.
Rule 901. Requirement of authentication or identification.
(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation,
the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming
with the requirements of this rule:
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter
is what it is claimed to be.
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the
genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation.
(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness. Comparison by the trier
of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated.
(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents,
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in
conjunction with circumstances.
(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by
opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances
connecting it with the alleged speaker.
(6) Telephone conversations. Telephone conservations, by evidence
that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone
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company to a particular person or business, if (A) in the case of a person,
circumstances, including self-identification, show the person answering
to be the one called, or (B) in the case of a business, the call was made to a
place of business and the conversation related to business reasonably
transacted over the telephone.
(7) Public records or reports. Evidence that a writing authorized by
law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or
a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any
form, is from the public office where items of this nature are kept.
(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a document or data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as to create
no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where it, if
authentic, would likely be, and (C) has been in existence 20 years or more
at the time it is offered.
(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system used
to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an
accurate result
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authentication or identification provided by court rule or statute of this state.
Advisory Committee Note. — Subdivision
(b)(2) is in accord with State v Freshwater 30
Utah 442, 85 Pac 447 (1906) Subdivision
(b)(8) is comparable with Rule 67 Utah Rules
of Evidence (1971), except that the former rule
imposed a 30-year requirement Subdivision

(b)(10) is an adaptation of subdivision (10) m
the comparable federal rules to conform to
state practice
Cross-References. — Official record, authentication of copy, Rule 44(a), U R C P
Wntmgs, manner of proof, ^ 78-25-9

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Nonexpert opinion on handwriting
Photographs
Public records or reports
Nonexpert opinion on handwriting.
Writing may be proved by evidence of a witness who has seen the person write, even if the
witness has seen him write only once and then
only his name The proof m such case may be
very light, but the jury will be permitted to
weigh it State v Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85
P 447 (1906) (referred to m Committee Note)
Photographs.
In general, if a competent witness with personal knowledge of the facts represented by a
photograph testifies that the photograph accurately reflects those facts, it is admissible, and
any minor discrepancies in the testimony
which go only to the details of the time and

place the picture was taken are not material to
the purpose for which the evidence is introduced and they do not undermine the adequacy
of the foundation for admissibility of the photographs State v Purcell, 711 P2d 243 (Utah
1985)
Public records or reports.
No Utah statute recognizes the certifying
signature of a notary public, without more, as
a proper means of authenticating an official
document as evidence State v Lamone, 610
P.2d 342 (Utah 1980)
Copies of county court records, certified by a
duly authorized notary public who had no custody of the documents, official or unofficial,
and who was not a deputy of the court clerk
the court clerk being the official custodian of
the documents, did not constitute adequate authentication State v Lamone, 610 P 2d 342
(Utah 1980).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§ 849 et seq.
C.J.S. — 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 733 et seq.;
32A C.J.S. Evidence § 743 et seq. .
AJLR. — Proof of authorship or identity of
sender of telegram as prerequisite of its admission in evidence, 5 A.L.R.3d 1018.
Public records kept or stored on electronic

computing equipment, 71 A.L*R.3d 232.
Construction and effect of § 1-202 of the
Uniform Commercial Code dealing with documents which are prima facie evidence of their
own
authenticity and genuineness, 72
A.L.R.3d 1243.
Ke
* Numbers. - Evidence *= 366 et seq.

Rule 902. Self-authentication.
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility
is not required with respect to the following:
(1) Domestic public documents under seal. A document bearing a
seal purporting to be that of the United States, or of any state, district,
commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof, or the Panama
Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of a political
subdivision, department, officer, or agency thereof, and a signature purporting to be an attestation or execution.
(2) Domestic public documents not under seal. A document purporting to bear the signature in his official capacity of an officer or employee of any entity included in Paragraph (1) hereof, having no seal, if a
public officer having a seal and having official duties in the district or
political subdivision of the officer or employee certifies under seal that
the signer has the official capacity and that the signature is genuine.
(3) Foreign public documents. A document purporting to be executed or attested in his official capacity by a person authorized by the
laws of a foreign country to make the execution or attestation, and accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature and
official position (A) of the executing or attesting person, or (B) of any
foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official
position relates to the execution or attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and official position relating to the
execution or attestation. A final certification may be made by a secretary
of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the
foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable
opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity
and accuracy of official documents, the court may, for good cause shown,
order that they be treated as presumptively authentic without final certification or permit them to be evidenced by an attested summary with or
without final certification.
(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official record or
report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded
or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data
compilations in any form, certified as correct by the custodian or other
person authorized to make the certification, by certificate complying with
Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this rule or complying with any law of the
United States or of this state.
(5) Official publications. Books, pamphlets, or other publications
purporting to be issued by public authority.
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(6) Newspapers and periodicals. Printed materials purporting to be
newspapers or periodicals.
(7) Trade inscriptions and the like. Inscriptions, signs, tags, or labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and indicating ownership, control, or origin.
(8) Acknowledged documents. Documents accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law by a
notary public or other officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments.
(9) Commercial paper and related documents. Commercial paper,
signatures thereon, and documents relating thereto to the extent provided by general commercial law.
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authentication or identification provided by court rule, statute, or as provided in
the constitution of this state.
Advisory Committee Note. — Subdivision
(1) is comparable to Rule 68, Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (2) is comparable to Rule 68(3),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (10) is Rule 902(10), Uniform
Rules of Evidence (1974).

This subdivision I sic] does not supersede
Rule 44, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
defines the form of certification.
Cross-References. — Proof of official
record, Rule 44, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Foreign public documents.
Copies of Colorado court records, certified by
notary public who had no custody, official or
unofficial, of the documents, were lacking sufficient authentication to permit their receipt

into evidence to establish that one charged
with unlawful possession of dangerous weapon
was on parole for felony. State v. Lamorie, 610
p.2d 342 (Utah 1980)

Rule 903. Subscribing witness' testimony unnecessary.
The testimony of a subscribing witness is not necessary to authenticate a
writing unless required by the laws of the jurisdiction whose laws govern the
validity of the writing.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim. Statutory provisions concerning authentication of documents,
such as, e.g., Title 78 Chapter 25, Utah Code

Annotated (1953), are unchanged by this rule,
Cross-References. — Proof of writing,
§ 78-25-9 et seq.

ARTICLE X.
CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS,
AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
Rule 1001. Definitions.
For purposes of this article the following definitions are applicable:
(1) Writings and recordings. '"Writings" and "recordings" consist of

602

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

xvuie V\JL

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Nonexpert opinion on handwriting.
Photographs.
Public records or reports.
Nonexpert opinion on handwriting.
Writing may be proved by evidence of a witness who has seen the person write, even if the
witness has seen him write only once and then
only his name. The proof in such case may be
very light, but the jury will be permitted to
weigh it. State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85
P. 447 (1906) (referred to in Committee Note).
Photographs.
In general, if a competent witness with personal knowledge of the facts represented by a
photograph testifies that the photograph accurately reflects those facts, it is admissible, and
any minor discrepancies in the testimony
which go only to the details of the time and
place the picture was taken are not material to
the purpose for which the evidence is introduced and they do not undermine the adequacy

of the foundation for admissibility of the photographs. State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243 (Utah
1985).
Public records or reports.
No Utah statute recognizes the certifying
signature of a notary public, without more, as
a proper means of authenticating an official
document as evidence. State v. Lamorie, 610
P.2d 342 (Utah 1980).
Copies of county court records, certified by a
duly authorized notary public who had no custody of the documents, official or unofficial,
and who was not a deputy of the court clerk,
the court clerk being the official custodian of
the documents, did not constitute adequate authentication. State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342
(Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§ 849 et seq.
C.J.S. — 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 733 et seq.;
32A C.J.S. Evidence § 743 et seq.
A.L.R. — Proof of authorship or identity of
sender of telegram as prerequisite of its admission in evidence, 5 A.L.R.3d 1018.
Public records kept or stored on electronic
computing equipment, 71 A.L.R.3d 232.

Construction and effect of § 1-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code dealing with documents which are prima facie evidence of their
own authenticity and genuineness, 72
A.L.R.3d 1243.
Key Numbers. — Evidence •=» 366 et seq.

Rule 902. Self-authentication.
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility
is not required with respect to the following:
(1) Domestic public documents under seal. A document bearing a
seal purporting to be that of the United States, or of any state, district,
commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof, or the Panama
Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of a political
subdivision, department, officer, or agency thereof, and a signature purporting to be an attestation or execution.
(2) Domestic public documents not under seal. A document purporting to bear the signature in his official capacity of an officer or employee of any entity included in Paragraph (1) hereof, having no seal, if a
public officer having a seal and having official duties in the district or
political subdivision of the officer or employee certifies under seal that
the signer has the official capacity and that the signature is genuine.
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(3) Foreign public documents. A document purporting to be executed or attested in his official capacity by a person authorized by the
laws of a foreign country to make the execution or attestation, and accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature and
official position (A) of the executing or attesting person, or (B) of any
foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official
position relates to the execution or attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and official position relating to the
execution or attestation. A final certification may be made by a secretary
of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the
foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable
opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity
and accuracy of official documents, the court may, for good cause shown,
order that they be treated as presumptively authentic without final certification or permit them to be evidenced by an attested summary with or
without final certification.
(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official record or
report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded
or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data
compilations in any form, certified as correct by the custodian or other
person authorized to make the certification, by certificate complying with
Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this rule or complying with any law of the
United States or of this state.
(5) Official publications. Books, pamphlets, or other publications
purporting to be issued by public authority.
(6) Newspapers and periodicals. Printed materials purporting to be
newspapers or periodicals.
(7) Trade inscriptions and the like. Inscriptions, signs, tags, or labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and indicating ownership, control, or origin.
(8) Acknowledged documents. Documents accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law by a
notary public or other officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments.
(9) Commercial paper and related documents. Commercial paper,
signatures thereon, and documents relating thereto to the extent provided by general commercial law.
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authentication or identification provided by court rule, statute, or as provided in
the constitution of this state.
Advisory Committee Note. — Subdivision
(1) is comparable to Rule 68, Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (2) is comparable to Rule 68(3),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
Subdivision (10) is Rule 902(10), Uniform
Rules of Evidence (1974).

This subdivision [sic] does not supersede
Rule 44, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
defines the form of certification.
Cross-References. — Proof of official
u. R . C .P.
record Rule u
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1 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
2

FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * *

DEANNA FOXLEY,
Case No. D 82 1591

Plaintiff,
vs.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

WILLIAM FOXLEY,
Defendant.
* * *

10
11

This cause came on to be heard before the

12 HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT, one of the Judges of the said
13 Court, on the 7th day of March, 1989, when and where the
14 following proceedings were had.
15

* * *

16

A ? P L A R A IJ C E S

17 For the Plaintiff;
18

MR. ROBERT W. HUGHES
Attorney at Law
50 Uest Third South, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah

19
20
21

For the Defendant;

MR. GREG S. ERICKSEN
Attorney at Law
1065 South 500 West
Bountiful, Utah
34010

22
23
24
25
HAL li. WALTON
Registered Professional Reporter

1

2

MR. KRICKSEK:

Nothing further from this witness,

your Honor.

3

TH2 COURT: You may ^step clownf Dr. Foxley.

4

MR. ERICXSiW*

The only final thing I have so far

5

as I know, we've only had one submission of attorney's fees

6

by Mr. Dyer.

7

and be called to the witness stand to testify as to my own

8

and some of those attorney's fees and what went on in

9

contradiction and rebuttal to his testimony.

I would make a proffer, if your Eonor wishes,

10

THJL,

COURT; Phil Dyer?

11

III;. HUGIL-S: He was the first witness.

12

THL COURT: Yeah.

13

ilR. HUGILuS; And in the interest of time, first,

14 i would object because he cross-examined Mr. Dyer as to
15 those. But I don't object to a proffer.

I also have a

16

schedule of support based upon the guidelines.

1?

introduce it, but it's something that I had provided, however

1*

in December, to Mr. Ericksen.

19

admitted along with all of the other exhibits.

20
21

2>iR. ERICKSEN:

I didn't

I would ask to have that

Object at this point. He closed his

case.

22

M R . HUGHES: Probably true.

23

THil COURT: V«ell, I suppose under the rules, he

24
25

can file those guideline worksheets any time you want to,
so go ahead.

112

MR. KUGHLS:

I was going .to say just file it.

THH COURT: Yeah.
difference.

Okay.

Doesn't really make that much

What do you want to do about attorney's

fees with Dyer?
IIR. ERICKSEN: Just aoing to make a proffer that
Iir. Dyer ran up an extraordinary amount of attorney's fees.
And part of those attorney's fees were incurred because of
the procedural mistakes by prior counsel. Part of the
attorney's fees were made trying to get me disqualified as
the attorney, which I donft think had any basis and were
frivolous.

They should never have,been brought.

I would

like the Court to consider that in rebuttal to his testimony<
TII^ COURT; Ckay.

Too much has been spent on

the attorney's fees and not enough been spent on the kids.
That's one of the problems, so where do we go from here?
IAR. ITUGHiiS: Two things, your Honor.

Ilr. Lricksen

or lir. Dyer was cross-examined on that issue. And if the
Court would like, that's on Page 7 and 3 of the transcript.
Also, there were my attorney's fees, and I would like to
put that in the record.
TH* COURT: You may.
liR. KUGIIES: Just as a matter of proffer.
want me sworn in?
MR. jJKICKSLN:

I object to that.

MR. HUGILL.3. Why would you object?
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Do you

Robert W. Hughes (1573)
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 534-1074
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TOIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNA FOXLEY

CHILD SUPPORT
OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(SOLE CUSTODY)

Plaintiff
vs,

Civil No.

WILLIAM M. FOXLEY >
Defendant.
AVAILABLE INCOME

Plaintiff

Gross Monthly Income

1a 791.QQ

P r e - E x i s t i n g Alimony or
C h i l d Support Orders You
Have P a i d

2a

Q

Adjusted Gross Income
3a 791.00
(1a-2a=3a,1b-2b=3b,3a+3b=3c)
Proportionate Share of
Combined Income
4a 10 %

Defendant
1b

Combined

6969.25

2b

-fl.

3b 6969,25

4b 9Q

3c 7760.25

%

(3a-3c=4a,3b-3c-4b)

CHILD SUPPORT NEED
Age Group
7-15
16-18
0-6
Number of Children
5c Q
per Age Group
5d
5a 1
5b_2_
(5a+5b+5c=5d)
Schedule Amount per
6c— Q
Chi Id
6a „
504
.
6b 607
(use the combined adjusted gross income from JC ana the
schedule appropriate to the total
number of children 7d
in 5d)
7b
Total Amount
7a 504
1214
7c Q
1718
(5ax6a=7a, 5bx6b=7b, 5cx6c=/c, /a+7b+/c=7d)
Work-Related Child Care Costs
8_ JL
Health and Dental Insurance Premiums for Children
Total Support Need
(7d+8+9=10)

9
10 1718

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION
Share of Obligation
(4ax10=11a, 4bx10=11b)

11a 171

11b 1547

Credit for Actual Payments in 8 and 9

12a0

12b 0

Parent's Total Child Support Obligation 13a 171
(11a-12a=13a, 11b-12b=13b)

13b 1547

The extended visitation amount applies only to the non-custodial
parent and to those months in which the order specifies that the
child spend at least 25 of 30 consecutive days with that parent.
Amount Paid During Extended Visitation
(13ax.75=14a, 13bx.75=14b)

14a 128.25

14b 1160-25

n o \ ^as^
i

IN THil DISTRICT COURT OF rZBE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND

2

FOR SALT LAKZ COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ri
4

* *

DtANNA F0XL2Y,

5
6
7
8

*

Plaintiff,

Case No. D 82 1591

vs.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

WILLIAM FOXL^Y,
Defendant.

9

* * *

10
11

This cause came on to be heard before the

12

HONORABLE RICHARD H. 110FFAT, one of the Judges of the said

13

Court, on the 7th day of March, 1989, when and where the

14

following proceedings were had.

15

* * *

16
17

A P P L A F. A II C h S
For the Plaintiff;

MR. ROBERT W. EUGHiiS
Attorney at Law
50 West Third South, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah

For the Defendant;

I1R. GRLG S. iIRICKSr.il
Attorney at Law
1065 South 500 West
Bountiful, Utah
34010

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

HAL L. WALTON
registered Professional Reporter

'

{

H£. KUGKLS:

2

I

TH£ COURT:

*

difference.

*

fees with Dyer?

5

Okay.

I was going .to say just file it.
Yeah.

Doesn't really make that much

What do you want to do about attorney's^

I1R. ERICKSJSN:

Just aoing to make a proffer that

*

I\X. Dyer ran up an extraordinary amount of attorney's fees.

7

And part of those attorney's fees were incurred because of

8

the procedural mistakes by prior counsel.

9

attorney's fees were made trying to get me disqualified as

Part of the

10. the attorney, which I don't think had any basis and were
11

frivolous.

12

like the Court to consider that in rebuttal to his testimony•

13

They should never have been brought.

TIIL COUivT;

Ckay.

I would

Too much has been spent on

'*

the attorney's fees and not enough been spent on the kids.

15

That's one of the problems, so where do we go from here?

16

13.

TTUGHLiS:

Two things, your Honor*

Ilr. Lricksen

1?

or Ilr. Dyer was cross-examined on that issue.

18

Court would like, that's on Page 7 and 3 of the transcript.

19

Also, there were ray attorney's fees, and I would like to

20

put that in the record.

21

THu COURT;

22

jia. HUGHES:

23

And if the

You may.
Just as a matter of proffer.

Do you

want me sworn in?

24

;.?£.

25

i££. IIUGIL-5. Why would you object?

JUKICKSLN:

I object to that.
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1

i>IK. LRICKS^N:

2

KR. HUGHES: YOu and I agreed we would put on my

Your .case is closed.

I ^attorney's fees", in chambers this morning. That would be
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

the last thing we did.

I said I would do it by proffer.

liR. ^RICICSIiN: I said I have no objections if you
did it during your case.
MR. IIUGIILS; Move tq proffer my attorney's fees,
your Honor.
TIL- COURT;

You may .go ahead.

liR. HUGHJS: Your Honor, let me have these marked,
if I could, please.

Two docunents I would submit to the

12 I Court, exhibits No. 16 and 17. Lxhibit No. 16 would be
13

the monthly statements that I sent to the plaintiff for

14

services rendered and would show an amount due presently,

15

including payments which she has made, of $3,180.

16

No. 17 was an affidavit that I prepared and filed with the

17

Court for our first hearing, one of our first hearings on

18

this matter, indicating my attorney's fees for $1,365 up

19

until February.

20

that from about 1937 up until February, it showed that

21

Deanna Foxley had a credit and that there were no services

22

provided during that time.

23

changed billings at that time ana those were not repre-

24

sented on the new computer bills that we entered into. For

*5

ease of the Court, I would waive my initial attorneyfs fees

exhibit

The Court, if it reviews this, will notice

The problem was that we had

114

1

in this natter, the $1/900, and subnit iay attorney's fees

2

would be as indicated in Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 16 and totall

3

S3,000.

4

made to me by the plaintiff.

I would have to include the payments as indicated

5

I would nove for the admission of Plaintiff's

6

Exhibit Nos. 16 and 17.

7

I'm: COURT:

8

I'IR. ilRICKiJbN:

9

I

•JEL COURT;

Over objection?
Over objection.

T

Jiil be received.

10

You gentlemen want summary?

H

11x1. ZLvECCJliN:

12

i'H^ COURT:

13

can rest his fingers.

1*

closing.

Like a closing, yes.

We'll take a ten-uinute break so Hal
Ve'll come back and listen to

15 I

( V h e r ^ w o n , the recess was taken.)

16

THL COURT:

17

MR. UP.ICKSLIJ;

You nay proceed.
First address child support, your

18

Honor.

19

requires that worksheets must be completed in accordance

The Uniform Child Support guidelines overview

20 I with instructions contained therein and submitted to the
21 I Court with supporting financial certification.

The problen

22 I that I have got with Mr. Hughes 1 offer of his schedule is
23

number one, tht,±e was no foundation for it/ and number two,

24

no ability to cross-examine by the defendant, number three,

25

it was submitted after he closed his case, and number four,

Robert W. Hughes (1573)
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lak*» rity, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 534-1074
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEANNA FOXLEY,
Plaintiff,

:
::

SUPPLEMENT TO ATTORNEYS
FEES OF ROBERT W. HUGHES

::

Civil No: D82-1591

s:

Judge Richard H. Moffat

vs.
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY,
Defendant.

Attached hereto is a copy of the attorneys1 fees
incurred by Robert W. Hughes through the date of trial. This
submission is to supplement the exhibit of attorneys1 fees
submitted at trial.
DATED this \Jg_ day of March, 1989.

W1-FOX-SA1

Robert W. Hughes
Attorney at Law
1000 Valley Tower, 50 West Broadway
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84101-2006
(801) 534-1074

DeAnna Foxley
735 Wall Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

BILLING DATE
ACC'T NO.

84102

03-13-89
HD-RWH-32
RWH87DM-816-1

:VI0US BALANCE

$3,180.00

'E

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED

INDIV

TIME

-28-89
•02-89
•02-89
-05-89
•05-89
•06-89
•06-89
•06-89
•07-89
-07-89
•07-89

Conference with client(sj .
Preparation for hearing.
Preparation of Response to Motion.
Preparation of Response to Motion.
Preparation for hearing.
Conference with client(s).
Preparation for hearing.
Telephone conf. with opposing attorney,
Preparation for hearing.
Court appearance for hearing.
Conference with client(s).

RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH

1.10
1.00
0.60
2.60
2.80
1.20
4.80
0.20
1.20
5.40
0.80

$60.00
$36.00
$156.00
$168.00
$72.00
$288.00
$12.00
$72.00
$324.00
$48.00

21.70

$1,302.00

^\L FOR THE ABOVE SERVICES
'E

EXPENSES

•07-89

Transcript Cost.

$66.00

$62.25

'AL FOR THE ABOVE EXPENSES

$62.25
TOTAL
PAYMENT RECEIVED
02—27—89
TOTAL PAYMENTS

$4,544.25

$150.00
$150.00
AMOUNT DUE

Prompt payment is appreciated.
Make check payable to Robert w. Hughes.
*** THANK YOU ***

$4,394.25

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

Ji

\6T

day of March,

1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENT TO
ATTORNEYS FEES OF ROBERT W. HUGHES was mailed, first-class
postage thereon prepaid, to Greg S. Ericksen, 1065 South 300
East, Bountiful, Utah 84010.

Btftjihel

GREG S. ERICKSEN - 1002
Attorney for Defendant
1065 South 500 West
Bountiful, Ot 84010
Telephone:(801)295-6841
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNA FOXLEY,

)

Plaintiff,

)

OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S PEES
OF ROBERT W. HUGHES
CIVIL NO.

D82-1591

VS.

JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY,

)

Defendant.

)

COMES NOW Greg S. Ericksen, counsel for Defendant who
objects to Supplement to Attorney's fees of Robert W. Hughes
based on the following:
Counsel for Plaintiff Robert W. Hughes did not submit his
attorney's fees during trial of this matter, and submits evidence
of attorney's fees after the case has been^Kejard and/a^6ed.
DATED this /9\

day of March, 1989/

Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of March, 1989# a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection was mailed via
first class mail, postage pre-paid thereon to Robert W. Hughes at
the following address: 1000 Valley Tower, 50 West Broadway, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101.

-7Mto« PltJJmi.

&•*.

MARY HAlLMAN
*
MISCrFoxley

AU6 -7 BBS

GREG S. ERICKSEN - 1002

Attorney for Defendant
1065 South 500 West
Bountiful, Ut 84010
Telephone:(801)295-6841
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNA FOXLEY,
ORDER
Plaintiff,

)
CIVIL NO.

D82-1591

vs.
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY,
Defe ndant.

)

THIS MATTER came on for hearing on 1st day of June, 1989, at
the hour of 2:00 p.m. before the honorable Richard Moffatt, Judge
of the above-entitled Court, sitting without jury on various
motions by the parties including:
-Defendant's Objection to Findings of Fact/Conclusions of
Law, Order, entered by this court on April 19, 1989;
-Defendant's Motion

for Judgment Notwithstanding

the

Verdict;
-Defendant's Motion for New Trial;
-Defendant's Motion to Extend Time for Filing Affidavits
-Defendant's Motion to Find Plaintiff in Contempt of Court
for Perjury.
Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel, Robert W.
Hughes, Defendant was not personally presnt but was represented
by counsel, Greg S. Ericksen.
1

The Court having reviewed the file and the Motions, and
having heard argument of Counsel and being advised in the
premises, now enters the following Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
1.

That Defendants Objection to portions of the Findings

of Fact/Conclusions of Law are hereby granted in part and ordered
to be amended in the following particulars:
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 2
"At the time of their marriage the defendant did not own any
real property, had no savings, had few household furnishings and
owned a pick up truck which he sold shortly after the marriage."
Ordered deleted.
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 3
"At the time of the marriage, the plaintiff owned no real
property, had approximately $8,900.00 in savings, owned two
automobiles

and had substantial household

furnishings and

appliances."
Ordered deleted.
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 4
"In 1977 the parties moved from Boise, Idaho, to Saltello,
Mexico, so that the defendant could attend medical "school."
Ordered deleted.
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 5
"The defendant attended several medical schools in Mexico.
In 1980 the parties relocated to Salt. Lake City, Utah, so that
the defendant could attend the University of Utah Medical

School."
Ordered deleted.
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 8
"During the marriage, the plaintiff was employed as a school
teacher in Mexico, at a Savings and Loan, and at a grocery store.
The defendant was also employed

at various times during the

marriage."
Ordered deleted.
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 10
"During the marriage, the parties depleted the plaintiff's
pre-marriage

savings and used the vehicles and other personal

property which the plaintiff had acquired prior to the marriage."
Ordered deleted.
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 33
"The Court

finds

that at

the time of the

modification

hearing, there has been a substantial change in circumstances of
the parties, that the plaintiff has a real and substantial need
for an increase in alimony and that she has endured substantial
and significant personal hardships both during the marriage and
since the time of the divorce."
Ordered changed to
The Court finds that at the time of the modification
hearing, there has been a substantial change in circumstances of
the parties, that the plaintiff has a real and substantial need
for an increase in alimony and that she.has endured substantial
and significant hardships since the time of the divorce•
3

2.

That

the

following

additions

to

Findings

of

Fact/Conclusions of Law are hereby approved and incorporated into
Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law.
A.

A finding of plaintiff's financial condition and

income at the time of the decree.
(1)

A finding of plaintiff's expenses at the time

of the decree at about a thousand seventy ($1,070.00).
(2)

A finding

that

the plaintiff

is currently

living in the same home she was living in at the time the decree
was entered.
(3)

A

finding

of

how

much

the plaintiff

is

currently earning.
3.

Defendant's Motion

for Judgement Notwithstanding

the

Verdict be and hereby is denied.
4.

Defendant's Motion

for New Trial

Defendant's

to Extend

be and hereby

is

denied.
5.

Motion

Time

to File

further

Affidavits In Support of Defendant's Motion for New Trial based
on newly discovered evidence be and hereby is denied.
6.

Defendant's Motion

to Find Plaintiff

in Contempt of

Court for Perjury be and hereby is denied.
7.

Defendant's Motion

to Strike Plaintiff's Attorney's

Fees from the order entered on April 19, 1989 be and hereby is
denied,
SO ORDERED.
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ROBERT W HUGHES (1573)
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone- {801)534-1074
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

DEANNA FOXLEY,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO.

D82-1591

vs.
JUDGE RICHAKD H MOFFAT
WILLIAM N. FOXLEY,
Defendant.
THIS MATTER came on for trial on September 22, 1988, at the
hour of 2:00 p.m. and was subsequently continued to March 7, 1989
at the hour of 10:00 a.m. on Plaintiff's Petition hi Mudify a
Decree of Divorce before the Honorable Richard H. Moffatt, Judge
of the above-entitled

Court, sitting

without jury.

Plaintiff, Deanna Foxley, was represented by Robert W

The

Hughes and

the Defendant, William N. Foxley, was represented by Greg S.
Ericksen.
The Court having heard testimony and received evidence,
argument to the Court having been made, and the Court being fully
advised in the premises is now prepared to enter its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married October 8,
1

1976.

At

the time of

the marriage,

the Plaintiff

was

an

undergraduate student and the Defendant was a graduate student at
Boise State University.
2.

The divorce trial was heard on June 30, 1983, a Decree

of Divorce was signed on August 22, 1983 and entered on August
23, 1983 to become final three months from the time of entry.
3.

At

the

time

of

the

divorce,

the

Plaintiff

was

unemployed and had no income and the Defendant was a student and
had an income, not including amounts received from student loans,
of approximately $50.00 per month.
4.

That at the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff had

expenses of $1,070.00 per month, the Defendant had expenses of
$895.00 per month.
5.

The Defendant graduated

from the University of Utah

Medical School in June of 1983.
6.

During the parties marriage the parties had four minor

children to wit:
was

Christine, born September 19, 1970.

(Christine

the daughter of the Plaintiff by a prior marriage who was

adopted by the Defendant in October of 1980.); Sarah, born May
23, 1977; Noall, born July 13, 1979; and Corinne, born April 15,
1982.
7.

During the marric'iye, the Plaintiff could not pursue her

formal education due to frequent relocations of the Defendant in
pursuing his medical career, because Plaintiff was employed at

2

various times during the marriage to assist in the support of the
family, and due to the fact that Plaintiff was pregnant for a
major portion of the tiipe.
The parties acquired

few household

furnishings,

appliances or other personal property during the marriage.
Hdl

For approximately the two years after the parties were

divorced, the Plaintiff and the parties minor children required
and received public assistance.
9.

The Court

finds that the Plaintiff

has done an

admirable job of caring for and educating the parties minor
children.
(T^) The Court finds that the Plaintiff and the minor
children have endured substantial hardships since the time of the
divorce.
11.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has made significant

personal sacrifices to further her education since the time of
the divorce.

After the divorce, Plaintiff obtained her bachelors

degree in Sociology and expects to receive her masters degree in
1989.

Plaintiff anticipates pursuing a Ph.D.

/completion of

Length of time for

this course of study will depend on course

requirements.
12.

The Plaintiff intends to continue with her education in

an effort to maximize her income potential.

The testimony and

evidence admitted at trial indicates that the prospects of the
Plaintiff finding well-paid and full-time employment in her field
will be difficult without additional education and that even with
3

additional education, employment

opportunities are projected to

be limited in the future.
13.

During the year 1987, the Plaintiff worked as a part-

time employee and had a gross income of $9,600:00.
14.

In 1987, the Defendant moved to Winslow, Arizona where

he is the only medical doctor who specializes in obstetrics and
gynecology in that vicinity.
15.

During the year 1987, the last year which the Defendant

was able

to provide a tax return, the Defendant had a gross

income of $128,437.00.

The Defendant's 1987 income was comprised

of wagps he received $16,031.00 as an employee, for approximately
6 months, at the Huerly Medical Center in Michigan, and from the
private practice of medicine.

The Defendant earned $112,406.00

from his private medical practice in approximately 6 months of
practice.
16.

The earnings of the Defendant as well jg^jjjjs-..future

potential have been considered by the court for the purpose of
determining whether the amount of alimony should be modified.
17.

The Defendant's present income is not completely clear

b\it the Court finds based upon the evidence that his gross income
can be interpreted as being as high as $224,000.00 a year but
certainly

under

no

circumstances

less

than

approximately

$120,000.00 per year.
18.

The Defendant was able to contribute $41,660.00 to a

Keogh Retirement Plan in 1987 and he anticipated contributing a
similar amount to a retirement plan in 1988.
4

19. The^purA^inds^tha^E^there^has^b^ett • a substantially
change of circtiistances^fn ^the parties'income since the time ofr
the divorce.
20.

Based upon the changes of circumstances, a modification

of the decree of divorce is warranted.

The Court does not,

however, find it necessary to invoke the theory of "Equitable
Restitution" as annunciated by the Utah Courts of Appeals nor is
it necessary to the Court to invoke the provisions of the
original divorce decree, wherein Judge Condor awarded an interest
in the Defendant's medical degree to the Plaintiff, since the
change of circumstances and the needs of the Plaintiff and the
minor children are sufficient to justify a modification of the
decree.
21.

Based upon the change of circumstances and the needs of

the children, child support to be paid by the Defendant should be
increased to the appropriate amount reflected in the judicial
district's support guidelines.
22.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has an adjusted

gross part-time

income of $800.00 per month and that the

Defendant has an adjusted gross income, after the subtractions of
his minimum necessary expenses, in excess of $6,985.00 per month.
23.

The proportionate share of the parties combined income

is 10% and 90% for the Plaintiff and the Defendant respectively.
24.

The Court finds that based upon the Plaintiff's and

Defendant's combined adjusted gross incomes, the amount of child
support per child should be the sum of $607.00 per month for the

minor children Sarah and Noall and should be the amount of
$504.00 for the parties youngest child, Corinne, for a total
child support amount of $1,718.00, monthly, for all three minor
children.

The Defendant, pursuant to the support guidelines,

should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $1,549.00 for child
support.
support

The Court further finds that the amount of child
for Corinne should increase to the sum of $607.00 per

month beginning on April 15, 1989, since she will be 7 years of
age on that date.

Therefore, beginning on April 15, 1989, the

Defendant's child support obligation will increase to $1,638.00
per month, $546.00 per month per minor child.
25.

The Court further finds that pursuant to the support

guidelines, the child support to be paid by the Defendant to the
Plaintiff should be decreased by 25* during those periods which
the Defendant has extended visitation of 25 consecutive or more
days with the minor child(ren).
26.

The Court finds that at the time of the hearing the

Plaintiff was in arrears in property taxes for her residence in
y/

excess of $3,000.00 and that theCglaintif f' s residence was in
jeopardy of being sold by the county for back property taxes; N
that the Plaintiff is nine payments behind on her mortgage
payments; that the Plaintiff has incurred substantial debts for
medicajL^ dental and orthodontic expenses for the children; that
the home where the Plaintiff and the minor children reside is in
poor condition and is in need ot substantial and major repairs,~
including repairs to the roof, foundatiojvr interior and exterior

walls and plumbing, rebuilding of the back entry into the home,
as well as other repairs; and, that the Plaintiff and the
children are in need of^new appliances and household furnishings,
including beds, furniture, a washer and dryer, a stove and also.
new clothing and shoes.

._.-.

The Plaintiff is currently living in the same home as
when the Decree was entered.
27.

The Court finds that at the time of the modification

hearing, there has been a substantial change in circumstances of
the parties, that the Plaintiff has a real and substantial need
for an increase in alimony and that she has endured substantial
and significant personal hardships since the time of the divorce.
28.

The Court finds that it is just and equitable that the

monthly alimony to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff
should be increased from $10.00 to the sum of $1,350.00 per
month.

Payment of alimony to commence as of April 19, 1989.

29.

The Court further finds that the Defendant should be

required to provide health and dental insurance for the minor
children of the parties.

The Court further finds that it is

equitable and just that any medical or dental expenses, including
orthodontic expenses, not paid by health and dental insurance
should be divided equally between the parties.
30.

The Court finds that attorney's fees should be awarded

to the Plaintiff in this case and that a reasonable attorney's
fees would be the sum of $4,394.00 plus her costs incurred
herein.
7

31.

The Court

finds that that the Plaintiff's Counsel's

fees were charged at the rate of $60.00 per hour, and considering
the length of time expended and the complexities of the issues,
the above award of attorney's fees is reasonable.
32.
be

That the Court did not consider whether alimony should

terminated

but

would

entertain

further

hearing

upon

application of either party or future petitions for modification.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There has been a substantial change of

since the Decree of Divorce was originally

circumstances

entered

in this

matter.
2.

It is fair and reasonable, based upon the change of

circumstances, that the amount of child support to be paid by the
Defendant should be increased in accordance with the schedules
set forth in the child support guidelines.
3.

The child support to be paid by the Defendant to the

Plaintiff

for support

of the parties minor

children

should

increase to the amount of $1,549.00 per month for the three minor
children.

The amount

of child

support

to be paid

by

the

Defendant to the Plaintiff for the support of the parties minor
children should

be

increased

to the amount of $1,638.00 per

month, $546.00 per child per month, beginning April 15, 1989.
4.

The Plaintiff

has endured and continues

to endure

significant and substantial hardships and has made significant
and substantial sacrifices since the time of the divorce and she
8

has a significant and substantial need at present and in the
future for an increase in alimony,
5.

It is fair and reasonable that the amount of alimony

payable from the Defendant to the Plaintiff be increased to
$1,350.00 per month, commencing April 19, 1989•
6.

The Defendant should provide health, accident and

dental insurance for the parties minor children and any medical
and dental costs, including orthodontic treatments, which are not
paid by medical insurance shall be divided equally between the
parties.
7.

It is just and reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded

attorney's fees in the amount of $4,394.00 plus costs incurred
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GREG S. ERrCKSEN - 1002
Attorney for Defendant
1065 South 500 West
Bountiful, Ut 84010
Telephone:(801)295-6841
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DFANNA FOXLEY,

}

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY,
Defendant.
STATE OF rTTAtf

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT FARR

j
)
}
)
)

CIVIL NO.

D82-1591

JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

)

)

ss.
COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

COMES NOW Robert Farr, who being duly placed under oat1
deposes and says as follows:
1.

That on about March, 1985, I became acquainted with one

Deanne. Foxley.
2.

During the course of 3 years from March, 1985 to about

July, 1988, I saw her socially.
3.

That during the period that I knew her, she informed me

that she was involved in a court action with her ex-husband, Bill
Foxley.
4.

That during the course of our involvement she confided

the following information to me.
A,

That she had to appear as if she was destitute in

order to get a big settlement from her ex-husband.
1

B.

She told me that she had turned down Job offers

that would have paid her

$40,000.00 per year until after the

court case with Bill Foxley was completed.
C.

She

told

me

that

she borrowed

money

for

her

education to make it appear that she was rehabilitating herself.
D.

She told me that she kept her work hours to a

minimum so it would appear that she earned very little.
E.

She told me that she would not disclose the fact

.that she had other income from other jobs to Bill's attorney.
F.

She told me that her attorney advised her to open

a secret bank account that would not disclose all of her money
that she had or earned.
She

told

me

that

she

would

not

tell

Bill's

attorney about the bank account but that it would be kept secret.
The bank account was kept at Utah Bank & Trust
iindi»r thp name of Deanna Foxley and her daughter Kristine Foxley.
6.

That

she

obtained

copies

of

cases

from

her

attorney so she could read them.
5.

That in April, 1989 I contacted Greg S. Ericksen with

this information.
DATED this

day of May, 1989.
*
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k
0BERT S. FARR

STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF DAVIS )

SS.
•

The undersigned be^ng a Notary Public does hereby certify
that on "this
day of May, 1989, personally appeared before
me, Robert Farr, who executed the foregoing Affidavit,
NOTftRY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My commission expires:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
T hereby certify that on this
day of May, 1989 a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit was mailed via firstcl^«=;s rp^ji. postage pr^-paid thereon to Robert W. Hughes at:
1000 Valley Tower, 50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, ntah 84101.
MARY PETERSEN

MISC:Fox]ey-F.aff
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1 IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
2

FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

* * *

4

DEANNA FOXLEY,
Plaintiff,

5
6
7
8

Case No. D 82 1591

vs.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

WILLIAM FOXLEY,
Defendant.
* * *

9
10
11

This cause cane on to be heard before the

12 EONORAELE RICHARD H. MOFFAT, one of the Judges of the said
13 Court, on the 1st day of June, 1989, when and where the
14 following proceedings were had.
* * *

15

A P P E

16
17 For the Plaintiff:
18

HR. ROBERT W. HUGHES
Attorney at Law
50 West Third South, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah

19
For the Defendant;
20
21

MR. GREG S. ERICKSEN
Attorney at Law
1065 South 500 West
Bountiful, Utah
84010

22
23
24
25
HAL H. WALTON
Registered Professional Reporter

1

him.

We provided to him the infonaation that he requested

I

«

2

and lir. iiricksen did not make a motion to conipel, or pursue
I

«

3

a motion to compel•

4

them what he asked for,

5

We both filed then because we aave

And the face is, your Honor, if there was error,
it was a harmless error. That second secret account, the
eld account simply -had no money really going through it with

8 J regard to chat, and this, I admit is a more thorny issue.
9 I And that regards the airplane. £l'Ir. bricksen did ask, do you
10 I have an interest in any business and ny client said no.
11

did anybody owe you any noney.

And

Ay client out just,. I think,

12 i>r. x'cxlcy*
13

but I think there's s>cme background that's very
important for the Court to understand what happened, howT this

14

15 whole transaction came about.

;:r. I'arr, as we indicated in

16 cur affidavit, was an acquaintance, and more than an
17

acquaintance of J-eanna loxley.

18

askec her to marry him on several occasions.

19

dating, 1-lr. Farr said why don ! t you give me sortie money and

20

we'll have this airplane.

21 I make a lot of money.
22

25

While they were

We 1 11 ce able to rent it and we.111

This is a smaii airplane and can be

used—

23 I
24

Ar. Tarr in fact asked h i m —

21K. r,AibAb^N:

Objection, your Honor.

r

fhis is agaiji

going in to testimony.
y:;^ CuUVi;' boil, that's hearsay as well.

